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Conscionable Judging: A Case Study of
California Courts’ Grapple with Challenges to
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
Paul Thomas*
This Note addresses a study of California state court decisions concerning the
invalidation of contracts on the ground that the contract is unconscionable. Cases in
this area have proliferated rapidly as a consequence of the frequent and highly
successful use of the unconscionability defense as a weapon to attack petitions to
compel mandatory arbitration of disputes. A review of four years of unconscionabilityrelated decisions in the California courts of appeal leads to certain conclusions, which
generally support a hypothesis that while judges form definite personal opinions as to
the legality of typical mandatory arbitration agreements, those opinions are only
weakly related to factors, such as political partisanship or workload, which might
explain strategic behavior by judges. It concludes by discussing the future of
unconscionability challenges in the arbitration arena in light of both recent U.S.
Supreme Court cases that may substantially influence those challenges, and the current
legislative environment.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011. The Author
would like to extend special thanks to Dorit Reiss for her invaluable assistance in evaluating and
critiquing early versions of the research that went into this Note, in addition to thanking the patient
and helpful editors and staff of the Hastings Law Journal.
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Introduction
In modern business life, most contracts that the average person
1
executes are form contracts. Most of these contracts are extraordinarily
1. Professor Slawson guessed that 99% of commercial contracts were form contracts—and that
was in 1971. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 529 (1971). What he did not add was that thanks to the proliferation of
wrongful termination claims, the prevalence of standard form employment contracts has become
almost as high. See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term,
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2

long and employ large quantities of legal terminology that is poorly
3
understood by the general population. In an effort to cope with this
situation, courts have, in the last forty years, revived the once-dormant
4
equitable defense of unconscionability. Unconscionability exists where a
contract is procedurally unconscionable—the contract was reached
because one party was misled as to the real terms, or because that party
was overmatched by the opposing party’s bargaining power—and
substantively unconscionable—the contract contains terms that are
patently unfair to the weaker party. Where both conditions are met, the
5
contract may be denied enforcement by courts.
In recent years, these arguments have been applied with particular
6
force to agreements to arbitrate disputes. The reason for this trend is
that other state regulations on arbitration have repeatedly run afoul of
7
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). This statute, passed in 1925, states
that arbitration agreements will be valid “save upon such grounds as
8
exist . . . for the revocation of any contract.” While states may create
general contract defenses that are equally applicable to both arbitration
agreements and other contracts, they may not create special defenses for
9
arbitration agreements. As a result, state laws that block the
enforcement of arbitration agreements are, according to modern

Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 637 (2007) (noting and analyzing the trend
toward standard contracts in the employment context).
2. By way of example, the iTunes Terms and Conditions were 15,172 words long when checked
by the Author in March 2011. Terms and Conditions, iTunes Store, http://www.apple.com/legal/
itunes/us/terms.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). Most online consumer form contracts are of similar
length.
3. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev.
233, 234 (2002).
4. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability,
52 Buff. L. Rev. 185, 194–96 (2004).
5. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. d (1981) (“[G]ross inequality of bargaining
power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, . . . may show that the
weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to
assent to the unfair terms.”). The California Supreme Court has stated the general rule succinctly in
numerous cases. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal.
2000).
6. Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How
the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 Hastings Bus. L.J. 39, 48
(2006). Post-dispute arbitration agreements (where each side agrees to take a particular dispute to an
arbitrator rather than to court) provide fundamentally different incentives to litigants. John F. Griffee,
Note, Against the Grain: The Arkansas Supreme Court Resists the Judicial Movement to Enforce
Mandatory-Arbitration Provisions in Employment Contracts in Arkansas Diagnostic Center, P.A. v.
Tahiri, 62 Ark. L. Rev. 381, 410 (2009).
7. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996); see also Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
8. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
9. Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281
(1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987).
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Supreme Court doctrine, preempted. Often the only defense available
to defeat a signed arbitration agreement is to argue that the clause is
unconscionable—it has become a doctrine of necessity. Many critics have
noted that courts, especially California courts, seem to apply a
particularly searching version of unconscionability analysis to arbitration
11
clauses. These critics say that such courts are less willing to assume that
the parties were of equal bargaining power and more willing to scrutinize
terms for whether they are fair or not fair, as opposed to whether they
12
are so unfair that they “shock the conscience.”
This study was commenced to answer three questions. First, what
are lower courts in California doing with unconscionability claims?
Second, can we isolate any differences between what different judges are
doing? Finally, what, if anything, needs to be done about it?
Part I is an introduction to the history of the unconscionability
doctrine, and its long and tortured interaction with arbitration
agreements. Part II advances three models that could potentially explain
lower court behavior. The first is the legal model, which argues that
judges primarily decide cases based on the interaction between
established legal doctrine and case facts. The second, the institutional
model, argues that courts behave like bureaucracies, protecting their turf
while trying to avoid crippling caseloads. The third, the policymaking
model, suggests that courts behave in such a way as to strategically
enhance the odds that they will advance their own policy preferences.
Part III addresses a strategic-choice critique based on the Priest-Klein
hypothesis which, if valid, would render the entire analytical approach
meaningless.
The dataset collected is described in Part IV. Part V covers the
implications of the dataset. Overall, in this area of the law, the data
appear to support the legal model best. Judges on different courts uphold
unconscionability defenses against arbitration agreements with different
frequencies, but once we adjust for lower court outcomes, the difference
appears to fall short of statistical significance. Individual judges appear to
decide cases in favor of unconscionability claims at different rates, but
those rates are not well correlated with political partisanship. I then
discuss the relationship between my findings and scholarly criticism of
the California courts’ approach. Part VI closes with a discussion of the
future of the interaction between arbitration and unconscionability. A
brief conclusion follows.

10. Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688.
11. See, e.g., Broome, supra note 6; Randall, supra note 4.
12. See Broome, supra note 6, at 40; Randall, supra note 4, at 214–16.
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I. Unconscionability, Arbitration, Legislation, and History:
The Roots of Strife
Understanding the origins of the unconscionability defense and its
interaction with mandatory arbitration agreements requires a whirlwind
trip through the history of American contract law. Important
developments in that area of law have tended to make challenges to
contracts on unconscionability grounds less successful over time. The
recent success of unconscionability-based challenges to arbitration
agreements represents a significant reversal of that trend.
A. Unconscionability
Prior to the early 1800s, the notion of “unconscionable” contracts as
13
a special subset of contracts would not have made much sense. “[T]he
community’s sense of fairness,” not that of the contracting parties,
14
determined whether a defendant would be found liable. This framework
changed dramatically during the period from 1810 to 1840, as courts
stopped examining contracts for fairness and instead began simply to ask
15
whether the parties agreed to bind themselves to a particular exchange.
Instead of questioning whether the price paid for a transaction was
“fair,” courts instead began to ask simply whether the apparently unfair
16
price served as evidence of fraud or deceit.
However, in a select minority of cases, courts continued to scrutinize
the values exchanged in a given deal. That subset has been aptly
characterized as cases involving “the old, the ignorant and the downright
17
shameful.” When the contract was between an elderly individual and a
younger, presumably more active one, courts closely scrutinized the deal
18
to see whether the elderly person had been manipulated. When the
contract involved a serious information disparity or a fiduciary
relationship, as between a lawyer and his client or a doctor and his
patient, courts were happy to step in and regulate the transaction
19
because of the presumed ignorance of the client or patient. Finally,
some contracts were so outrageously one-sided that judges simply could
20
not bring themselves to enforce those deals.

13. My discussion of early American contract law is derived primarily from Morton Horwitz. See
generally Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780–1860, at 140–210 (1977).
14. Id. at 166.
15. Id. at 180.
16. Id.
17. For numerous examples of such cases, see the eponymous article by Matthew S. Winings, The
Old, the Ignorant and the Downright Shameful (Jan. 19, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=650822.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id. at 14.
20. Id. at 20–21.
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This hazy conception was first codified into something similar to the
modern concept of unconscionability in the Uniform Commercial Code
21
in 1952. The drafters had considerable difficulty arriving at a definition
22
that could satisfy their goals. Indeed, ultimately the concept of
substantive unconscionability was left completely undefined. This vague
23
concept was then imported into the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
Despite the efforts of scholars on both sides of the issue to produce a
more workable test for unconscionability, it has continued to defy formal
24
definition. Nevertheless, we find that today, very few contracts are
voided as unconscionable—unless they can be classified as “agreements
25
to arbitrate which appear to be biased against the weaker party.”
B. Arbitration
Arbitration in the United States substantially predates
independence. Merchants in eighteenth-century colonial America
routinely used arbitration as a substitute for the costly, time-consuming,
26
and unpredictable verdicts of courts. Merchants saw courts as thoroughly
27
hostile entities. They stigmatized lawyers and judges as ignorant of
commercial principles; indeed, some early American reformers wanted
to abolish the legal system as such and replace it entirely with binding
28
arbitration.
This did not happen—indeed, early nineteenth-century courts were
able to gain substantial oversight powers over arbitration. “[T]raditional
common law deference to the reports of arbitrators,” writes Horwitz,

21. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1952 Official Draft) (“If the court finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to be unconscionable it may refuse to enforce the contract or may strike any
unconscionable clauses and enforce the contract as if the stricken clause had never existed.”); see also
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2005) (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any term of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.”).
22. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 485, 489–501 (1967).
23. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981).
24. See, e.g., Robert Dugan, The Application of Substantive Unconscionability to Standardized
Contracts—A Systematic Approach, 18 New Eng. L. Rev. 77, 84 (1982) (broad definition); Paul
Bennett Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 53 Clev. St. L. Rev.
187, 188 (2005) (narrow definition). But see Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net
Function, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 73, 117–18 (2006) (arguing in favor of continued subjectivity in the
doctrine).
25. See infra Part IV.
26. Horwitz, supra note 13, at 145.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 148–49 and references therein; see also Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of
American Law 13–14 (3d ed. 2005) (describing colonial era efforts to replace lawsuits with
arbitrations).
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“had begun rapidly to dissipate.” In 1833, a Pennsylvania lawyer could
30
write that “the award of arbitrators weighs not a feather.” As contract
law became increasingly merchant-friendly, the forums that they had
previously made use of withered, victims of a deadly combination of
direct attack by the legal profession and a loss of their basic raison
d’être—to allow merchants to evade the “premodern” tendencies of
31
courts evaluating contracts on fairness grounds. With that theory
seemingly dead, merchants no longer had reason to fight tooth and nail
32
for an arbitration system, as they had in the eighteenth century.
C. Legislation, Conflict, and Precedent
Enter the Federal Arbitration Act, passed in 1925 in an effort to
33
reinvigorate arbitration law in America. According to the Supreme
Court’s authoritative construction of this Act—a construction that is
34
intensely contested by some scholars —the Act “declared a national
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to
require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting
35
parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” However—perhaps supporting
the notion that the FAA was intended only to promote the kind of
merchant-to-merchant arbitration that was commonplace in colonial
36
times —issues of FAA interpretation took a surprisingly long time to
materialize. The first fifty-nine years of the Act were for that reason
fairly unremarkable, punctuated by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Wilko v. Swan, which held that causes of action under public regulatory
37
statutes could not be arbitrated.
Then, in 1983, the Supreme Court decided Southland Corp. v.
38
Keating. In this case, several 7-Eleven convenience store franchisees
sued the parent company for violations of the California Franchise
39
Investment Law (“CFIL”). The contracts that they alleged violated the

29. Horwitz, supra note 13, at 150.
30. Id. at 153.
31. Id. at 153–54.
32. See id. at 154.
33. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 25-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925). The Act was renamed
the Federal Arbitration Act in 1947. Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–
16 (2006)).
34. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 931 (1999); David S. Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set It
Free: How “Mandatory” Undermines “Arbitration” (Univ. of Wis. Legal Studies, Paper No. 1052,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1006826.
35. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
36. Stone, supra note 34, at 969–94.
37. 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989).
38. 465 U.S. 1.
39. Id. at 4; see California Franchise Investment Law, Cal. Corp. Code §§ 31000–31516 (West
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CFIL contained mandatory arbitration clauses, and the Supreme Court
40
ruled that the FAA was not procedural but substantive federal law. This
endowed the FAA with the power to preempt state laws, like the CFIL,
that required certain types of actions to be brought in court
41
proceedings. Post-Southland, there is no state law recourse, other than
generalized contract law defenses, when a valid contract specifies that
42
some other type of legal proceeding is to be replaced with arbitration.
Southland marked the beginning of a vast expansion of the scope of
the FAA. Within a few years, the Court had extended it to cover
43
statutory claims, to preempt state laws granting causes of action in
44
court, to preempt state laws requiring disclosure of arbitration
45
agreements in prominent typeface, to overrule Wilko and cover federal
statutory claims where Congress had not expressly de-authorized
46
arbitration, to cover all forms of commerce including purely intrastate
47
commerce, and finally, in 2001, in perhaps the greatest leap forward of
all, to construe the FAA definitively to cover nearly all employment
48
contracts.
Why has the Supreme Court taken this route? The Court purports
to be merely interpreting the FAA to create a “pro-arbitration policy,”
but the legislative history of the provision lends little support to that
49
assertion. It could be that the Court genuinely believes that clearing
dockets of federal courts, and referring aggrieved parties to a faster and
more streamlined system will ultimately benefit litigants, even if they do
50
not see it as a benefit. A more cynical view is that the conservativelyinclined Court seeks simply to undercut and destroy civil rights law by
allowing stronger parties to force weaker ones to bargain away their
51
rights.

1996).
40. 465 U.S. at 12–13.
41. Id. at 10.
42. Id. at 10–11.
43. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225–26 (1987); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 624–25 (1985).
44. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490–91 (1987).
45. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687–88 (1996).
46. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26–27 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480–84 (1989).
47. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272–73 (1995).
48. See Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
49. See Stone, supra note 34, at 969–94.
50. Certainly, pro-arbitration scholars have argued as much. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales,
Compulsory Arbitration: The Grand Experiment in Employment 3–10 (1997); Stephen J. Ware, The
Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—With Particular Consideration of Class Actions
and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. Am. Arb. 251, 254 (2006) (discussing cost savings to litigants).
51. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The
Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1017, 1050 (1996) (“The result is a bitter irony
for the worker—she has more rights and less protection than ever.”).
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D. Modern Unconscionability and Arbitration Law
To recap, under current arbitration law, the FAA covers agreements
to arbitrate both contractual and statutory claims. The Act’s preemptive
force reaches even the decisions of state courts in states whose own
arbitration law would forbid the enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements—not on grounds of unconscionability, but simply as a matter
52
of declared public policy. District courts have power to stay proceedings
and compel arbitration in cases where one party alleges a preexisting
53
agreement to arbitrate a dispute. And, from a procedural standpoint,
California courts have a nearly identical power (and duty) to compel
54
arbitration where an agreement to arbitrate is alleged in state court. In
each case, assuming that the party demanding arbitration—usually the
55
defendant —can show that the two sides agreed to a contract including
an arbitration clause, the court will order arbitration unless the party
opposing arbitration can show that the agreement is unlawful by means
56
of a state contract law defense. Such defenses include fraud, duress,
57
economic duress, mistake, impossibility, and, crucially, unconscionability.
In most instances, when a prospective plaintiff has unwittingly
agreed to arbitrate her disputes with the defendant, she will be unable to
demonstrate most of the above defenses. For instance, one is not
typically “duressed” into purchasing a personal computer or into agreeing
58
to work as a paralegal for a law firm. Unconscionability, however, is
something of a cure-all. Almost any one-sided contract can be credibly
alleged to be substantively unconscionable on grounds of unfairness, and
almost any form contract can be alleged to be a contract of adhesion and
thus procedurally suspect.
There is yet another phenomenon to be explained. The foregoing
explains why many arbitration agreements are challenged on grounds of
unconscionability; what it does not explain is why so high a proportion of
59
unconscionability challenges relate to arbitration clauses. Lawyers—
52. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 8-1-41(3) (2002) (forbidding specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements in Alabama state courts). This provision was struck down under the Supremacy Clause in
Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 272–73.
53. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
54. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2 (West 2007).
55. Most orders to arbitrate disputes in my sample arose after a plaintiff sued the defendant for
statutory or common-law injuries, and the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had previously agreed to
arbitrate the dispute in question.
56. 9 U.S.C. § 2; Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.
57. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 151–199 (1981).
58. It should be noted, however, that these arguments do occasionally prevail. See, e.g., Engalla v.
Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 922 (Cal. 1997) (deciding an arbitration agreement was
invalid where it was induced by fraudulent exaggeration of the speed with which claims could be
resolved).
59. And they do. A substantial majority of unconscionability claims arise through arbitration
agreements. Only 30 of 119 cases in the sample collected did not address an arbitration agreement. See
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especially plaintiffs’ lawyers who are working on a contingent fee basis
and not subject to the inherent conflicts of interest created by billing for
hours worked—tend to pursue claims that they feel they can win. And
the simple fact is that unconscionability challenges to arbitration
agreements succeed at a higher rate than unconscionability challenges to
60
other agreements. What, then, can explain this behavior on the part of
lower courts?

II. Theories of Lower Court Action
To answer the question just raised, we must develop some theories
of lower court behavior that can account for the apparent discrepancy
between U.S. Supreme Court precedent and lower court practice. This
Part advances three models of action, which will be evaluated in Part V
using data collected for this Note.
A. The Behavior of Judges
In an ideal world, it would perhaps be the case that judges were
motivated entirely by considerations of the law, efficient social policy,
and justice. We do not live in an ideal world, however. Substantial
evidence developed over the past eighty years indicates that judges act in
ways which are self-interested, both in the sense of advancing their
61
preferred policies and in the sense of advancing their careers. This
model is particularly associated with the school of legal behaviorism
62
championed by Harold Spaeth. The most aggressive argument of
behaviorists, that courts decide cases almost entirely on the basis of
personal ideology, has been tempered to some degree by more recent
findings that judges are less likely to vote to overrule precedents they
disagree with than they are to vote for their preferred policy in matters
63
of first impression.
The situation becomes doubly complex when dealing with judges at
lower levels than that of the U.S. Supreme Court. Supreme Court
Justices have no higher position to aspire to and answer to no genuinely
binding precedent at all, since any Supreme Court decision can be

infra Part IV.
60. See infra Part IV; see also Broome, supra note 6, at 48.
61. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 33
(1993) (calling the “legal model” of decisionmaking according to predetermined rules a “mythology”).
62. See id.
63. Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got To Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal
Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 Law & Soc. Inquiry 465, 480 (2001) (citing Jeffrey A. Segal &
Robert M. Howard, The Systematic Study of Stare Decisis (2000) (unpublished paper presented at
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting)). The point—that judges are human actors
subject to human foibles—is well taken, however.
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64

overruled by a later decision. This is not to say that there are no checks
65
on the discretion of the Court, but the checks surely pale in comparison
to those faced by lower court judges. Judges seeking to ascend within the
66
justice system face some pressure to avoid reversals on appeal.
Moreover, while lower federal court judges have life tenure, state court
67
judges routinely face elections.
68
Why, then, do critics observe the apparently scofflaw behavior of
lower courts in this area? One explanation for this failure is legal—that
the Court’s opinions in this area are unusually unpersuasive. The
justifications it has offered for its pro-arbitration stance include instances
69
of quoting early decisions out of context, overruling longstanding
70
precedents on dubious grounds, and assuming the truth of the
71
conclusions it seeks to reach. The Court has arguably issued decisions
72
undermining the very goals which it purports to seek. If judges are

64. This point is of particular relevance in the arbitration arena in light of the Court’s overruling
the major case Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), in 1989. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
65. The Supreme Court is always subject to override by Congress, either through constitutional
amendment or through the much easier process of rewriting legislation. See generally Jeb Barnes,
Overruled? Legislative Overrides, Pluralism, and Contemporary Court-Congress Relations
(2004) (describing the process of legislative overrides as well as a framework for analyzing how those
overrides come to be). Justices are also theoretically subject to the power of impeachment, although
no Supreme Court Justice has ever been successfully impeached. Adam A. Perlin, The Impeachment
of Samuel Chase: Redefining Judicial Independence, 62 Rutgers L. Rev. 725, 788 (2010).
66. A pressure to which new Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor could no doubt relate. See,
e.g., Tony Mauro, Critics Pounce on Sotomayor’s Reversal Rate, Nat’l L.J. (June 1, 2009),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431087253&slreturn =1&hbxlogin=1.
67. This Note focuses on California. California trial judges face retention elections every six
years; justices of the courts of appeals and the California Supreme Court face retention elections every
twelve years. Cal. Const. art. 6, § 16. These elections are rarely significant, although several Supreme
Court justices were unseated in a retention election in 1986, largely over their opposition to the death
penalty. Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the
California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2007, 2007 (1988).
68. See Broome, supra note 6.
69. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
70. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
71. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)
(assuming, without evidence to the contrary, that arbitration forums are just as effective as judicial
forums at vindicating statutory rights).
72. “[J]udges are trained in the law. They are not penologists, psychiatrists, public administrators,
or educators.” Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? 20 (1991) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor, for that matter, are
they arbitrators. One scholar of arbitration has indeed taken the Supreme Court to task for
“judicializing” arbitration and, in the process, destroying many of the virtues that supposedly make it
attractive in the first place, like cost-effectiveness and quickness. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 3–4. In
particular, the need to appear to avoid gutting the protections of federal civil rights statutes has posed
a serious problem for advocates of arbitration, and the halfway “solutions” that have been innovated
by lower federal and state courts—and ratified by the Supreme Court’s silence—have reintroduced
many of the procedural aspects that arbitration was supposed to have obviated. See Cole v. Burns Int’l
Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.,
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primarily focused on apolitical legal analysis, these features might be
particularly important.
Another explanation is institutional. The legal system is a large and
73
Arguably, the Court lacks the time,
ponderous bureaucracy.
temperament, and authority to shape the complicated, turgid
74
bureaucracies of lower courts. Critics of judicial action have observed
that it lacks many of the features of highly effective bureaucratic
75
structures, such as technical expertise. Particularly problematic, in their
eyes, is the problem of independent actors on the lower tiers: the upper
levels of the hierarchy have difficulty enforcing a systematic approach to
76
case law upon the judges at the lower levels. Lower court judges by no
means run the risk of automatic reversal when they write opinions
77
challenging the reasoning of their superiors.
State supreme courts, in particular, face relatively few constraints on
their authority. They have certain institutional advantages that the U.S.
Supreme Court does not, including the ability to review all cases and all
78
issues in those cases. The Court, by contrast, cannot usually challenge
79
state courts’ interpretations of state law issues. In this area, therefore,
state courts are able largely to roam free of review, so long as they
80
carefully structure their opinions. The California Supreme Court’s
arbitration jurisprudence has, perhaps for these reasons, been quite
effective at implementing clear and understandable arbitration-law
81
norms throughout the state court system.

6 P.3d 669, 682 (Cal. 2000).
73. As of 1985, there were over 27,000 judges in the American judicial system, including
magistrates and administrative judges. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and
Reform 37 (1996). The number today is undoubtedly higher. California’s substantially smaller system
fields 2,134 authorized judgeships (7 supreme court judgeships, 105 appeals court judgeships, and 2,022
superior court judgeships), though that number excludes Administrative Law Judges. Judicial
Council of Cal., 2009 Court Statistics Report 22, 45 (2009).
74. Rosenberg, supra note 72, at 18–19.
75. Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and
Public Policy 138–39 (1994).
76. There are two fundamental problems here. One is independence: Judges’ tenure and juries’
impermanence make the lower rungs of the legal system nearly impervious to bureaucratic oversight.
Id. at 141. The other is lack of expandability: There simply cannot be more than a certain number of
justices on a supreme court without making the institution unmanageable, and the cap on numbers is
an implied cap on workload. Id. at 144–45.
77. It helps if they do so in terms that are not flagrantly insubordinate. For an example of how not
to do this, see Professor Randall’s description of Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto. Randall, supra
note 4, at 220–21.
78. Cal. Const. art. 6, § 12(b) (“The Supreme Court may review the decision of a court of appeal
in any cause.”).
79. See, e.g., Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S.
684, 688 (1959).
80. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of
Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1420, 1482 (2008).
81. See, e.g., Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007) (followed twenty-one times);
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A rational lower court judge, seeking to advance her career or
82
policy preferences strategically, must thus take heed of several factors.
Is it likely that the case in question will be overruled if decided contrary
to existing precedent? If so, is there any way to write an opinion such
that it will decrease those risks? Is writing such an opinion—which may
have to be narrower or rely on certain difficult-to-review technical
grounds—worth the potential missed opportunity to advance a favored
cause? Is it possible to lose the battle and win the war—for instance, if
the Supreme Court overrules the decision, might Congress intervene and
override that ruling? If the judge works in a jurisdiction where she is
subject to competitive elections, will writing an opinion benefit or
83
decrease her reelection prospects? Finally, will deciding a case in a
84
certain way increase or decrease her workload? Each of these factors
might influence the manner in which a judge evaluates a claim of
unconscionability in contract formation.
B. Models of Judicial Behavior
With that background laid, I will now introduce the models with
which I plan to evaluate the performance of California judges in the
arbitration-unconscionability arena. The first is what I will call the legal
model. This model argues that judges are primarily focused on doing a
good job in particular cases, and only secondarily concerned with the
85
long-term implications of their decisions. This model draws support
from studies showing that judges tend to vote their policy preferences
86
more often when they feel unconstrained by precedent. The influence

Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (followed fifty-two times); Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs. Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (followed 116 times).
82. An excellent analysis of the factors involved in strategic lower court judging, on which I rely
implicitly throughout this Part, has recently been authored by Professor Bruhl. Bruhl, supra note 80.
83. For a profoundly disturbing look at the importance of this final factor to judging in the
arbitration arena, see Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of
Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & Pol. 645 (1999). Professor Ware documents a split in the
Alabama judiciary between judges whose campaigns are funded by trial lawyers and those whose
campaigns are funded by corporations. Id. Virtually without fail, Alabama Supreme Court judges,
during the time frame he studied, voted in favor of the interests of their campaign contributors. Id. at
684.
84. The intuitive hypothesis, that judges will try to achieve an “ideal” workload, and that cases in
excess of that ideal will be more prone to efforts to remove them from the judge’s docket, has received
some recent scholarly support. See, e.g., Lee Reeves, Pragmatism over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower
Court Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence (Stanford Public Law, Working Paper No. 1024632,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024632.
85. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 Duke L.J. 1405,
1407 n.2 (2000) (describing a conventional account of the legal decisionmaking process).
86. See Gillman, supra note 63, at 480; see also Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, Does
Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 102 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 369, 381 (2008) (“In contrast to the pure forms of the attitudinal model, we find strong
evidence that legal principles are influential.”).
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of law is necessarily lessened when precedent in a given area is
87
conflicting, unclear, or poorly justified. If judges are often constrained
by doctrine or facts into voting against their policy preferences, perhaps
they can be excused for occasional teleological decisions in extreme
cases. This model would explain the gap between the success rates of
unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements and challenges to
other contracts as a consequence of specific features about arbitration
agreements that make them more likely to be unconscionable than are
other contracts.
The second is what I will call the institutional model. According to
this theory, judges and lawyers may feel threatened by arbitration.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers fight it tooth and nail because they fear the loss of
business, defense lawyers support it halfheartedly because they, too, fear
their trial skills becoming obsolete, and judges act to maintain their
authority by dominating as large a swath of jurisdiction as possible. It
appears to be a theory to which the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court,
88
at least as of 1985 and perhaps even today, subscribes. This theory
draws support from the studies demonstrating judges’ docket-clearing
89
tendencies. Under this theory, lower court judges will favor arbitration
in relatively busy districts and disfavor it in relatively quiet districts.
The final theory will be referred to as the policymaking theory.
Under this theory, conservative judges generally act to increase the
power of corporations and to promote a more classically “liberal” view
of contract law, while judicial liberals do the opposite. Under this theory,
judges will tend to favor or oppose arbitration based on their political
leanings—conservative judges being pro-arbitration and antiunconscionability, and liberal judges being pro-unconscionability and
anti-arbitration. This theory draws its strongest support from qualitative
findings on the influence of political leanings on arbitration case
90
decisions. Courts staffed by large numbers of judges who share political
leanings can be expected to decide cases in accordance with those views.
To be credible, this theory requires some sort of predictive model, even

87. For an argument that the U.S. Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence is all of the above,
see Schwartz, supra note 34, at 32 (“As a law-clarifying institution, the Supreme Court has performed
wretchedly since the mid-1980s on arbitration questions.”). The precedents are clear enough, such as
they are, but the Court has repeatedly refused to handle apparent interpretational conflicts by lower
courts, thus opening the way to the deep splits in decisionmaking discussed earlier in this work. Id. In
California, however, the leading case is unquestionably Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). It is, by far, the most cited single case in the sample that I
collected. See supra note 81.
88. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 n.14 (1985)
(“[T]he [FAA] was designed to overcome an anachronistic judicial hostility to agreements to arbitrate,
which American courts had borrowed from English common law.”).
89. See Reeves, supra note 84, at 4.
90. See Ware, supra 83, at 684.
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one as simple as judges’ party affiliation. Otherwise the assertion that
lower court judges are making policy is difficult to advance beyond the
tautological argument that “the judge did X, therefore the judge must
91
want to do X, and the way we know that is because he did X.” For this
92
study, I have used political partisanship as the underlying predictor.
Each of these models likely has a grain of truth to it, and it is very
unlikely that one will predominate overwhelmingly. However, a look at
decisional data will hopefully help indicate the relative importance of
these factors and, thus, point the way to how the process might be
reformed to make it more transparent and less capricious. If the legal
model holds sway, then the status quo may be acceptable. If the root
problem is institutional, the proper reform may be adding more judges
or, since there are reasons to doubt the efficacy of expanding the
93
judiciary, redrawing district lines and reassigning judges. If the problem
is that judges are acting as policymakers, however, then an overhaul of
the process to remove it from the courts entirely may be warranted. If
the decision whether to force a plaintiff to arbitrate is a political one,
regardless, then perhaps it should be handled by the political branches.

III. Methodological Critique: Are Results Due to Litigants’
Strategy Rather than to Ideology?
George Priest and Benjamin Klein authored a seminal 1984 article
94
on plaintiffs’ win rates in civil litigation. In this study, Priest and Klein
used a theoretical-mathematics approach to demonstrate that actual win
rates for plaintiffs in particular types of cases are not closely indicative of
95
how well the law in those cases favors the plaintiffs. Because the vast
majority of lawsuits settle before reaching litigation, and particularly
before reaching appeal, the subset of cases on which judges build the

91. This confronts a persistent and perhaps insoluble problem: “[P]olicy preferences may operate
at a metalevel, where justices choose judicial values in a manner to advance broad policy goals.”
Bailey & Maltzman, supra note 86, at 382. In other words, a judge might become, say, a strong
advocate of “judicial restraint” precisely because he believes that adopting such a philosophy will
support decisions which promote his policy goals. However, a finding that judges are acting in
accordance with a well-established political ideology should resolve most of these concerns, because
judges cannot openly elect a “judicial philosophy” of favoring Democratic or Republican causes. See
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges?,
37 J. Legal Stud. 87, 95 (2008) (describing pressures on judges to mask decisionmaking by means of
endorsing “widely held” judicial philosophies).
92. Other nontautological predictors could include judicial demographics (for example, is there a
difference on this topic between male and female judges?) or personality traits (do extroverted judges
tend to vote differently than introverted judges?). Fruitful further studies could be conducted in this
area.
93. Komesar, supra note 75, at 144.
94. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal
Stud. 1 (1984).
95. Id. at 4–5.
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appellate record that lawyers are so familiar with is remarkably tiny and
96
suffers from severe and pervasive selection bias. As a consequence,
litigated cases tend to be significantly more “even” than are the subset of
cases as a whole, with plaintiffs’ win rates in appealed cases approaching
97
50%, even in unusually hostile or favorable areas of the law. Even
relatively high levels of uncertainty as to the likelihood of winning—a
characteristic
of
impenetrable,
case-specific
doctrines
like
unconscionability—have relatively limited impacts on the percentage of
wins for a given party in actually litigated cases, although they do tend to
increase the theoretical percentage of cases that will reach litigation in
98
the first place.
Subsequent writings have refined the hypothesis somewhat,
however. Where parties’ estimates of the value of their cases are
disproportionately higher or lower than the true value, trial win rates
99
may be lower or higher than 50%, respectively. Another empirical
study has shown evidence that the type of judge before whom a case is to
100
be argued influences the rates at which parties will settle. Differences
in quality of lawyering can impact success rates to an extent that
101
penetrates the Priest-Klein effect. Finally, arbitration agreements can
102
impact the types of cases which reach the attention of courts.

96. Id. at 2 (“It is very difficult to infer specific characteristics from observations of 0.2 percent or
less of a population, especially where there is no evidence that the observations . . . were selected
randomly.”).
97. Id. at 19.
98. Id. at 23.
99. Robert E. Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis Without the 50 Percent Rule: Some
Experimental Evidence, 24 J. Legal Stud. 209, 225–26 (1995). An empirical study has demonstrated
this effect in the context of employment law. See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The
Selection of Employment Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein
Hypothesis, 24 J. Legal Stud. 427, 450–51 (1995) (noting that plaintiffs’ win rates in employment
discrimination cases drop during recessions, when the average case for discrimination is weaker, and
that such cases settle at higher rates, although enough go to trial, due to misvaluation of the strength of
the case, to pull down the overall win rate).
100. Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to
Settle, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 315, 336 (1999) (arguing that judicial background is statistically
significant in determining whether cases settle or go to trial in a sample of recorded cases and
settlements in Tax Court). It must be noted, however, that the same study found only a statistically
insignificant effect on decisionmaking from the political party that appointed a given judge. Id. at 357.
101. Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner
Cases, 77 Geo. L.J. 1567, 1582–83 (1989).
102. Christopher R. Drahozal, Ex Ante Selection of Disputes for Litigation 2 (Feb. 27, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=510162.
This effect does not typically come into play in the area of unconscionability challenges, because if an
arbitration clause is unconscionable, that challenge can be heard by a court. However, it is extremely
important in another area of arbitration law, namely arbitrability—the determination of whether a
given dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement—because the parties to a contract may
agree, if they do so carefully, to send that issue to the arbitrator and allow her to determine her own
jurisdiction. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
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Given this, what, exactly, do plaintiffs’ win rates in appealed
unconscionability cases tell us? Observed regression toward a roughly
50% mean could reflect litigation incentives of the parties more than the
actual content of the law. However, there are some important differences
between most arbitration clause appeals and other kinds of appeals.
First, they are far less costly on average to produce than a typical appeal,
because any denial of a motion to compel arbitration can be the subject
103
of an interlocutory appeal under both state and federal law. Parties
favoring arbitration have more incentive to take long shot appeals when
the appeals process is available at a fraction of the cost of appealing a
trial verdict. Second, for defendants, a finding that an arbitration
agreement is valid may effectively end the dispute process completely, as
104
plaintiffs are unwilling to risk adding arbitration fees to their costs.
Parties favoring arbitration are allowed, by design, to take a risk in which
a win is highly beneficial and a loss is of only minimal consequence.
Moreover, a public trial has reputational consequences for defendants
105
that an arbitration, which is presumptively private, does not; thus, the
defendant in a civil suit has an incentive to push cases to arbitration that
is not counterbalanced by a similar incentive for the plaintiff. As a
consequence, the stakes involved for the parties are not equal, violating
one of the key assumptions required for the win rate to trend toward
106
50%. Third, disputes over whether a case should go to arbitration or
litigation are not quite as amenable to settlement as, for example, a
damages action is, since the question of whether a case is to be arbitrated
107
or litigated is an either/or question. Of course, the parties could settle
the underlying claim, but the low opportunity cost of not settling prior to
the motion to compel arbitration means that settlement is not necessarily

103. In California, a petition to compel arbitration is heard as a summary motion and may be filed
in lieu of answering a complaint. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2 (West 2007) (“On petition . . . the
court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an
agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists . . . .”). An average case consumes around seventy-two
hours of attorney time. David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 72,
90 (1983). Taking a case through jury trial and appeal would undoubtedly raise that figure immensely.
104. Indeed, as a result of this incentive, the California Supreme Court has ordered courts to
closely scrutinize arbitration agreements that, by their terms, deny the availability of class actions.
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005).
105. See, e.g., Am. Arbitration Ass’n Commercial Arbitration R. 23 (2009) (“The arbitrator and
the AAA shall maintain the privacy of the hearings unless the law provides to the contrary.”). The
result of arbitration—but not the process—will often be revealed to the public if one party contests the
validity of the arbitration award, because the other party will then have to file a motion to confirm the
award, and such a motion is a matter of public record. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1285 (2007) (“Any
party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct or
vacate the award.”); id. § 1287.4 (“If an award is confirmed, judgment shall be entered in conformity
therewith.”). The federal provision is substantially similar. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).
106. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 99, at 430.
107. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2.
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as high a priority for the parties as it would be if failure to settle would
108
lead to a jury trial.
In summary, the litigation incentives do not necessarily support the
notion that arbitration cases ought to evidence a fifty-fifty win-loss rate
for each party at the appellate level. Instead, the FAA and its California
cognate encourage defendants to take advantage of favorable procedural
rules to make long-shot appellate attacks on trial courts’ denials of
motions to compel arbitration. A plaintiffs’ win rate of 50% is not
necessarily inevitable, and thus differences in that win rate can give
evidence for substantive arguments about judging.

IV. The Sample
The sample consists of 119 cases from the California courts of
109
appeal. This sample comprised cases decided in the First, Second, and
Fourth Districts of the California Courts of Appeal between 2005 and
2008. I have elected, for reasons of simplicity, to treat cases that severed
unconscionable terms from agreements and then compelled arbitration
as victories for unconscionability claims, though the true degree to which
such an outcome represents a “victory” to an individual is highly casespecific. I also excluded cases from the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Districts,
because each district reported fewer than ten cases in which
unconscionability determined the outcome.
This Part aims to address three issues. First, does this sample
support the existing consensus that arbitration agreements are
interpreted differently than other contracts for unconscionability
purposes? Second, are there significant differences in the rate at which
individual California courts find unconscionability? Third, are there
significant differences in the rate at which individual judges find
unconscionability? Part IV.A establishes whether arbitration agreements
are unique at all in the landscape of California contract law. Part IV.B
tests the institutional model to find out whether different districts handle
cases differently. Part IV.C tests the policymaking model.

108. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. This point should not be exaggerated, as parties
may settle on an arbitration in which the defendant pays most of the costs of the proceeding.
109. The sample was assembled primarily through a Lexis search, using the keyword
“unconscionability.” Many cases which contained the term were excluded, however, because the issue
was briefly discussed or mentioned but did not determine the outcome of the case. Many arbitration
agreements are invalidated for lack of offer and acceptance, rendering defenses to acceptance, such as
unconscionability, redundant. In certain instances, this necessarily entailed a degree of authorial
judgment. A full list of cases, judges, and case information used in this Note is on file with the Author
and is available on the Hastings Law Journal’s website. See Thomas Data, Hastings Law Journal,
http://www.hastingslawjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Thomas_data_62-HLJ.pdf (last visited
Mar. 31, 2011).
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A. Arbitration and Non-Arbitration Cases Are Not on Equal
Footing
With respect to how courts treat arbitration and non-arbitration
cases, this sample largely replicates findings that have been made by
other authors who have attempted to analyze the way California courts
110
deal with the issue of unconscionability in different situations. The
findings are summarized in Table 1 below. Each court found in favor of
unconscionability at a noticeably higher rate in arbitration cases, as
111
compared to other cases.
Table 1: Differential Success Rates for Unconscionability
Claimants in Arbitration and Non-Arbitration Cases, and in
Individual California Appellate Districts
Court of Decision

Arbitration Cases

California Courts of Appeal
First District
Second District
Fourth District

45/89 (50.6%)
17/28 (60.7%)
16/44 (36.3%)
12/17 (70.6%)

Non-Arbitration
Cases
5/30 (16.7%)
1/8 (12.5%)
2/9 (22.2%)
2/13 (15.4%)

A caveat must be noted, however. For procedural reasons, the vast
majority of California arbitration cases that are appealed come to the
appellate court after the defendant’s motions to dismiss and to compel
112
arbitration have been denied by the trial court. By contrast, appeals in
non-unconscionability cases must come after a final decision. Parties who
113
win at the trial level are much more successful at the appellate level,
which biases the sample of arbitration cases slightly in favor of wins for
the plaintiff, and the sample of non-arbitration cases in favor of wins for
the defendant. The bias in favor of appeals from plaintiff wins at the trial
court accounts for some of the disparity between arbitration and non114
arbitration cases, but not all. It does appear that California courts are

110. Broome, supra note 6, at 48; Randall, supra note 4, at 194–96.
111. A chi-square calculation, testing against a null hypothesis (“the hypothesis that an
observed difference (as between the means of two samples) is due to chance alone and not due to a
systematic cause,” Null Hypothesis, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
null%20hypothesis (last visited Mar. 31, 2011)), reveals that the null hypothesis can be rejected with a
less than 5% probability of error.
112. Under both the FAA and the California Arbitration Act, parties seeking arbitration are
entitled to an immediate appeal when their motion to compel arbitration is denied by the trial court.
9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) (2006); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1294.2 (West 2007).
113. Indeed, my sample did not include a single case in which a trial court was reversed on appeal
in a non-arbitration case. When a party opposing an order compelling arbitration lost at the trial level,
their appeals were successful or partially successful in just seven of twenty-one cases.
114. At the trial level, parties challenging a contract—usually plaintiffs in the lawsuit—won 5 of 30
non-arbitration unconscionability cases (17.5%) and 68 out of 89 arbitration unconscionability cases
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using a more rigorous version of the unconscionability doctrine when it
comes to arbitration agreements.
115
Courts
These findings confirm those of Professor Broome.
applying California law are most likely discriminating against arbitration
agreements in a manner that is preempted by the interpretation of the
116
FAA advanced by the Supreme Court. Having addressed the question
of whether the California courts appear to disfavor arbitration agreements
with a cautious affirmative, we can now move on to the question of why
they find in the way that they do.
B. Different Districts Produce Different Outcomes in
Unconscionability Cases, but Why?
The First, Second, and Fourth Districts have not, in recent years,
decided arbitration-unconscionability cases for contract-challengers at
the same rates. As noted in Table 1, the Second District has been notably
more hostile, and the Fourth District notably more receptive, to
unconscionability claims than the baseline rate. This distinction is
117
statistically significant. In other words, it is unlikely that the distribution
is entirely random.
However, there are some confounding factors. In particular, as
noted in Table 2, the Second District faced an unusual number of appeals
in “writ cases”—cases where the defendant won in the trial court and the

(77.2%). In arbitration cases, the plaintiffs won 38 out of 68 cases at the appellate level after a trial
court victory (55.9%) and 7 out of 21 cases after a trial court loss (33.3%). Calculating the expected
win rate, given the odds of winning at trial looks like so: (hypothesized odds of winning at trial
level)(total number of cases)(odds of winning on appeal given trial win) + (hypothesized odds of losing
at trial)(total number of cases)(odds of winning on appeal given trial loss) = expected wins given
hypothesized odds of winning at trial. If plaintiffs won at the trial level only 17.5% of the time, we
would thus expect 33.2 plaintiffs’ wins (based on a calculation of (.175)(89)(.559) + (.825)(89)(.333) =
33.2), or a win rate of 37.3%, still comfortably in excess of the 17.5% win rate observed for nonarbitration unconscionability cases. Both trial and appellate courts, in other words, appear to be
contributing substantially to the increased win rates of plaintiffs at the appellate level.
115. See generally Broome, supra note 6.
116. Id. at 65. Advocates of mandatory arbitration, however, may find this a hollow victory. The
U.S. Supreme Court has looked askance at attempts to prove discrimination through statistics in the
past. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of . . . invidious . . . discrimination . . . .”); see also
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (“[D]iscriminatory purpose . . . . implies that the
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not
merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” (quoting Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney,
422 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the equal protection context,
discrimination must generally be proved through an analysis of the intent of the defendant. Davis,
426 U.S. at 249. While cross-applying legal doctrines from one area of law to another is hazardous, a
similar requirement in the arbitration context would require a showing that a judge acted because of
animus toward arbitration and not because of a good-faith belief that he was doing his job correctly—
not an easy task.
117. A chi-square calculation indicates that the odds of the distribution arising due to random
2
chance are less than 3%. Specifically, χ = 7.45 (df = 2) produces a p-value of 0.0241.
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plaintiff sought a writ of mandate to block the entry of judgment on the
118
defendant’s petition. When those cases are excluded from the sample,
there is almost no observed effect, with a greater than one-in-four chance
119
that the minor effect that remains is due entirely to chance.
Table 2: Challengers’ Win Rates in Non-Writ Cases Compared to
Total Win Rates
Court of Decision
California Courts of Appeal
First District
Second District
Fourth District

Overall
Challengers’ Win
Rate
45/89 (50.6%)
17/28 (60.7%)
16/44 (35.6%)
12/17 (70.6%)

Challengers’ Win
Rate in Non-Writ
Cases
38/68 (55.9%)
16/25 (64%)
13/29 (44.8%)
9/14 (64.3%)

The results are, therefore, inconclusive. The Second District faced
an unusual number of writ cases but also decided them against
120
unconscionability claimants in an unusual percentage of cases. The truth
probably lies somewhere in the middle of the two results presented.
Unfortunately, that places these results right on the borderline of the 5%
level of statistical significance. The hypothesis that California courts of
appeal are deciding unconscionability cases at different baseline rates
must be classified as unproven.
C. Judges Decide Cases at Different Challenger Win Rates
In addition to recording the results, I also recorded which judges
121
122
voted for—and, in rare cases, against —each of the decisions. This
allows us to analyze the distribution of plaintiff win rates before
individual judges. Conveniently, the nearly coin-flip odds that a given
challenger will succeed means that if cases were to be decided entirely at

118. Writ cases comprised 15 of 44 Second District cases, but only 3 of 28 First District cases and 3
of 17 Fourth District cases. See Thomas Data, supra note 109.
2
119. A chi-square calculation (χ = 2.49, df = 2) produces a p-value of 0.288.
120. Perceptive readers will note that challengers’ win rates in the Fourth District actually dropped
when writ cases were excluded, as all three writ appellants in that District succeeded in at least
partially invalidating the arbitration clauses they challenged.
121. Dissents are extremely rare in this sample of arbitration-unconscionability cases. Four cases
had full dissents, and one had a partial concurrence, out of eighty-nine total cases. Dissenting judges
were coded as voting for the opposite of the result reached.
122. The sample of cases contained, all told, votes by ninety-five different judges. However, many
of these judges heard only one or two cases. I opted to exclude judges who heard fewer than three
cases for two reasons: First, attempting to draw any conclusion from such a small sample would be
rash; and, second, their inclusion would severely bias results toward the edges of the probability
distribution, because each judge who heard only one case decided for or against the challenger in
100% of the cases he or she heard.

Thomas-62-HLJ-1065 (Do Not Delete)

1086

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

4/16/2011 1:16 PM

[Vol. 62:1065

random, the distribution of judges would be a Gaussian bell-curve
distribution, with most judges clustered closely around the 50% mark.
The data, however, show a different result.
Graph 1: Distribution of Judges, by Challenger Win Rates

As depicted in Graph 1, California judges, instead, appear to cluster
in a somewhat bimodal distribution, with a large group of judges before
whom challengers rarely win and a large group of judges who usually
decide in favor of challengers. Indeed, the majority of judges either
decide for challengers 25% of the time or less, or 75% of the time or
more—60.9% of all votes cast in this sample were cast by judges at the
123
ends of the ideological spectrum, just 39.1% by judges in the center.
D. Rates at Which Judges Decide for Unconscionability Claimants
Are Poorly Correlated with Political Affiliation
The majority of California’s appellate bench has been appointed to
124
their current positions by Republican governors, because Republicans
have held the California governorship for thirty-one of the past forty
years. Table 3 below shows the outcome of an effort to compare political
affiliation with outcomes.
The only thing that can be said about these results is that there are
none. Only in the second quartile are Republicans significantly
underrepresented relative to their overall proportion within the judging
population; they are most overrepresented, albeit minimally so, in the

123. See infra Table 3.
124. Appointment dates for members of the California courts can mostly be found at the
California Courts website. California Appellate Court Legacy Project, Cal. Courts,
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/courtsofappeal/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2011); see also Kenneth
James Arnold, California Courts and Judges Handbook (2010–2011 ed. 2010).

Thomas-62-HLJ-1065 (Do Not Delete)

March 2011]

4/16/2011 1:16 PM

CONSCIONABLE JUDGING

1087

first and fourth. One must, at least, question the notion that Republicanappointed judges are more likely than Democrat-appointed judges to
vote against unconscionability claimants. Judicial votes are not a proxy
for political allegiance but instead appear to represent something more
individualized.
Table 3: Magnitude and Partisan Affiliation of Challenger
Win Rate Quartiles
Quartile
(Challenger
Win Rates)
1st (0–25%)
2nd (26–49%)
3rd (50–75%)
4th (76–100%)
Total

Votes in Quartile by Judges
Appointed by Republican
Governors (Percentage of
Total Votes in Quartile)
54 (68.4%)
22 (53.7%)
27 (64.3%)
34 (68%)
137 (64.6%)

Total Votes Cast by
Judges in Quartile
(Percentage of Total
Votes)
79 (37.3%)
41 (19.3%)
42 (19.8%)
50 (23.6%)
212

V. Analysis and Inferences
From the foregoing, two tentative conclusions may be drawn. First,
the legal model appears to best explain the observed results. Second,
while some aspects of the criticism of California courts in this area are on
point, particularly the observation that California courts do not treat
arbitration agreements like any other contract, other criticisms find little
support in the data.
A. The Legal Model, the Policymaking Model, and the
Institutional Model
The legal model appears to find the best support in the data
collected, though the issue is by no means settled. Comparing it to the
policymaking model, judges’ rates of decision for or against
unconscionability challenges differ significantly from a normal
125
distribution. However, this difference correlates poorly to a benchmark
126
of “ideological” decisionmaking or political partisanship. If California
judges are in fact making policy through their courtrooms on this issue, it
is at least a policy that lacks the obvious institutional sponsors and clearcut intellectual alliances of partisan affiliation.
The legal model performs more equivocally when compared with
the institutional model. There are real differences in win rates between
districts in the California courts. The busiest California appellate

125. See supra Part IV.C.
126. See supra Part IV.D.
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district—the Second—is the most pro-arbitration and antiunconscionability of the three districts, with significant numbers of cases
127
However, the least pro-arbitration and most proreported.
unconscionability district is the Fourth District, which is in between the
128
First and Second in docket size. Meanwhile, none of the three differ
significantly in their treatment of non-arbitration unconscionability
129
claims. Those claims, unlike arbitration claims, typically are litigated
through trial before reaching the appellate stage; unlike arbitration
unconscionability provisions, a finding of unconscionability does not
keep a pending case on the lower court’s docket. However, the data are
sufficiently inconclusive that those differences may be the product of a
130
small sample size. Further study is clearly warranted, but for the time
being, I am unable to state with confidence that the size of an appellate
district’s docket—or for that matter, the demographic makeup of its
underlying counties—plays any real role in the way it decides
unconscionability claims.
B. The Legal Model and Critics of the California Courts
Critics of the lower courts’ arbitration jurisprudence have no doubts
about the notion that judges are behaving strategically. In their view,
lower court judges are routinely forming opinions based on outdated
131
prejudice against arbitration, intentionally opting for difficult-to-review
132
legal theories in order to decrease the risk of reversals on appeal, and
relying on legal theories that are preempted by existing Supreme Court
133
precedent. They are doing so to advance their own preferences about
134
the role of the law, and in some states, to win contentious reelection
135
battles with well-funded pro-business candidates. “California courts,”
in one account, treat arbitration agreements as a waiver of substantive
rights, and thus “differently precisely because they are arbitration
136
agreements, in direct contradiction of the Federal Arbitration Act.”
127. Judicial Council of Cal., supra note 73, at 22.
128. Id.
129. See supra Table 1. The contrast with arbitration-unconscionability success rates is stark.
130. See supra Part IV.B. Even four years’ worth of California cases has produced fewer than fifty
non-arbitration unconscionability cases directly on point in each of the three most prolific districts, to
say nothing of the other districts, which had so few cases as to render making an informed judgment
about their tendencies impossible.
131. Randall, supra note 4, at 221.
132. Bruhl, supra note 80, at 1452.
133. Randall, supra note 4, at 209.
134. Broome, supra note 6, at 60 (“This approach appears to run counter to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s statement . . . that ‘[m]ere inequality in bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold
that arbitration agreements are [not] enforceable.’” (first alteration in original) (quoting Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991)).
135. Ware, supra note 83, at 684.
136. Randall, supra note 4, at 209.
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One scholar has gone so far as to call California law in this sector “an
137
unconscionable application of the unconscionability doctrine.” These
commentators have a fair point: According to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the FAA, courts must treat arbitration agreements as
138
they would any other form of contract. Judicial opinions are not
supposed to be exempt from the scope of the FAA’s preemption
doctrine—otherwise, judges could accomplish through common law rules
139
what legislatures cannot accomplish by statute. This critique is difficult
to contest on its face; indeed, the best counterargument for proponents
of strong checks on arbitration agreements may be tu quoque, arguing
that the array of Supreme Court cases dramatically expanding arbitration
140
141
agreements have been equally instrumentally motivated.
In some ways, these results validate those criticisms. It is simple
142
enough to notice the pattern of success rates, and that pattern is
replicated in this dataset. The inconclusive analysis of different California
appellate districts raises, but does not prove, the possibility that courts
are using arbitration as a nonideological method of controlling their
143
caseloads. On the other hand, another possibility—that arbitration law
144
is, as it were, politics by other means—finds little support in these data.
Overall, the statistical criticism appears valid, but in my view, the data
tend to show that judges are voting based on a genuine—if perhaps
misguided—belief that the arbitration clauses that they are reviewing are
truly unconscionable and, thus, invalid contracts.

VI. The Future of Arbitration-Unconscionability Law
In recent months, the future of the application of unconscionability
to arbitration agreements has become increasingly unclear. The Supreme
145
Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center West v. Jackson has thrown the law
146
in this area into flux. Moreover, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, a case
heard in the October 2010 Term, has the potential to enact further
significant change. Over and above their impact on the substantive law,

137. Broome, supra note 6, at 39.
138. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
139. E.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1984) (preempting judicial construction
of a California franchisee protection statute).
140. See supra Part I.C.
141. “The Court’s decision is impelled by an understandable desire to encourage the use of
arbitration, but it utterly fails to recognize the clear congressional intent underlying the FAA.”
Southland, 465 U.S. at 22–23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
142. See supra Part IV.A.
143. See supra Part IV.B.
144. See supra Part IV.C.
145. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
146. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010).
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these cases—and, arguably, the uncoincidental timing—arguably
demonstrate that the Supreme Court is aware of both the potential
power of unconscionability claims in this area and the shifting political
winds.
In Jackson, decided in June 2010, the Court compelled arbitration
147
by a plaintiff who had signed an arbitration agreement. That agreement
declared that the arbitrator, not a court, would exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over all claims that parts of the agreement were void or
148
voidable. Such jurisdiction, the Court held, could legally encompass the
149
claim that the arbitration clause as a whole was unconscionable. In
court, the plaintiff was allowed only to challenge the unconscionability of
the particular sentence of the arbitration agreement that gave the
150
arbitrator jurisdiction over challenges to enforcement of the agreement.
Justice Stevens, in dissent, analogized the majority’s reasoning to playing
151
with “Russian nesting dolls.” While there is still an unconscionability
doll inside the shell of the majority opinion, it appears to be a
considerably smaller one.
Worse yet for advocates of unconscionability challenges, the Court
accepted, and heard arguments in, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, which
could further undermine unconscionability challenges. The case arose
out of attempts to construct a “class arbitration” from what would
otherwise have been numerous individual arbitration claims, most for
152
trivial sums of money, against AT&T Mobility. A California court held
153
that the agreement was invalid. It appears likely that the Supreme
Court will reverse that finding and declare California’s Discover Bank
154
doctrine, which asserts the power of California courts to compel class
155
arbitration in some situations, preempted by the FAA.

147. 130 S. Ct. at 2781.
148. Id. at 2775.
149. Id. at 2779. This opinion represents a substantial extension of the Court’s earlier holding that
a party wishing to challenge a petition to compel arbitration must allege that the arbitration clause, not
merely some other term of a larger contract, is unconscionable. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395, 403–04 (1967).
150. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2780. At first blush, this might seem irrelevant, but the Court made clear
that it expected considerably fewer agreements to be invalidated as unconscionable, because plaintiffs
would be compelled to demonstrate how various aspects of the arbitration agreement were unfair as
applied solely to the arbitrator’s ruling on jurisdiction. Id.
151. Id. at 2786 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility, 584 F.3d 849, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010).
153. Id. at 855.
154. So named for Discover Bank v. Superior Court, in which the California Supreme Court
reversed a court of appeals panel—whose decision, as it happens, is included within the sample used in
this Note—and held that arbitration clauses that prohibit class actions in adhesion contracts, inserted
as part of a scheme to cheat customers out of small sums of money, are unconscionable. 113 P.3d 1100,
1109–10 (Cal. 2005).
155. This is, of course, only a prediction. But note that the other arbitration case which the Court
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The Court does not operate in a vacuum. Professor Barnes discusses
the Court, particularly in the statutory interpretation arena, as being
contained within a policymaking framework in which congressional
overrides of Court decisions have varying degrees of potential
156
Bills, such as the Arbitration Fairness Act, have
effectiveness.
repeatedly been introduced in Congress to roll back drastically the ability
of employers, producers, and franchisors to force employees, consumers,
157
and franchisees into binding arbitration. At the moment, however,
momentum in the area of legislative arbitration reform appears to have
stalled. Congress appears happy to tack ad hoc arbitration bans, in
specific areas of the law, onto new legislation, as it did successfully with
158
159
the Franken Amendment and the stimulus bill, but the Arbitration
Fairness Act appears to be dead for the foreseeable future.
A cynical view of the Court’s recent jurisprudence, then, might
suggest that the Court is more than willing to read its own pro-arbitration
policy preferences into the law, but only during periods of time when
Congress is unable or unwilling to act. Meanwhile, lower courts may find
that periods when Congress threatens to override Supreme Court
decisions grant them a certain degree of freedom to defy the Court.
It remains to be seen whether the Court’s newest efforts to take
control of the field of arbitration law will be more successful than in the
past. For the reasons outlined, those efforts are misguided. This Note has
shown that, at least in California, differences over the unconscionability,
or lack thereof, of arbitration agreements seem to be honestly held and
not the product of partisan pressures or a deliberate bias against
arbitration.
Should the Supreme Court continue to severely limit the ad hoc
160
efforts of lower courts to address “the downright shameful” aspects of
arbitration agreements, Congress should intervene. One possible reform
at the federal level is, of course, the Arbitration Fairness Act, which
would bar the enforcement of most unconscionable arbitration

heard in the October 2009 term, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., compelled numerous
individual arbitrations in another case in which a state court had instead ordered a class arbitration.
130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776–77 (2010). It seems overwhelmingly likely that the Court’s purpose in taking
AT&T Mobility is to apply one or both of Stolt-Nielsen and Jackson to strike down the Discover Bank
doctrine.
156. Barnes, supra note 65, at 6–7 (describing the “pluralist,” “hyperpluralist,” and “capture”
theories of the legislative override process). Whether one would predict arbitration law to be pluralist
or hyperpluralist might depend on whether one sees the aggrieved consumer or employee as a
“discrete, insular minorit[y]” or not. Id. at 192.
157. See., e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
158. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409
(2009).
159. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553(d), 123 Stat.
301.
160. See Winings, supra note 17.
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161

agreements. However, it might also throw the baby out with the
bathwater by barring many appropriate arbitration agreements.
Alternatively, Congress could take heed of Professor Korobkin’s
theory of bounded rationality and pass legislation which has the effect of
limiting the duty of consumers and employees to read and negotiate
162
nonsalient terms in form contracts. Finally, Congress could create a
small, independent federal agency, modeled on the Securities and
Exchange Commission, empowered to promulgate minimum rules for
certain types of arbitration and to compel arbitration providers to
register and provide information to the agency and to the public. The
intended effect of all of these proposed solutions would be to modernize
and clarify arbitration law and to minimize jurisdictional inequities, while
returning unconscionability to its former function as a seldom-used
contractual “safety valve” doctrine.

Conclusion
To summarize, under present law, arbitration agreements may be
challenged successfully on grounds of unconscionability. The likelihood
of success depends significantly on the individual judges involved, and
the distribution of the rates at which particular judges find arbitration
agreements unconscionable makes clear that judges take markedly
different philosophical approaches to these claims. However, those
approaches appear to have little relationship with their partisan
affiliations or to their workload.
Significant changes in this area may already be occurring, thanks to
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that has seemingly made
unconscionability challenges more difficult to prove. In order to mitigate
the potentially harsh effects of these decisions, and to prevent additional
inconsistencies in decisionmaking between lower courts of various
jurisdictions and the Supreme Court, Congress should consider an
overhaul of arbitration law to help clarify the proper standard by which
courts should evaluate arbitration agreements.

161. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). The bill, in brief, would
declare arbitration clauses unenforceable if they involve employment, consumer, or franchise
agreements, or disputes under civil rights statutes. It also makes it slightly easier to challenge the
validity of an arbitration agreement in court rather than before the arbitrator.
162. Professor Korobkin’s theory is that salient terms—which is to say, terms that the average
reader of a contract will be highly conscious of when deciding whether to sign—in adhesion
agreements will be highly efficient, but that nonsalient terms will be, whether efficiently or not, simply
the most pro-drafter and anti-adherent. Russell Kuroki, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1290–95 (2003). Though unfortunately
somewhat tangential to this piece, his theory is a brilliant one and could be the basis for future
legislation.

